During my time in the hospital at Cam Ranh Bay while I was recovering from hepatitis, I found and read Street Without Joy by Bernard B. Fall.  I was fascinated to find Fall's account of the end of the French Army's Groupement Mobile (GM) 100.  Fall wrote, "Groupement Mobile 100 was one of the best and heaviest units of its type.  The hard core of its troops were the veterans of the French battalion from the U.N. Forces in Korea, battle-hardened elite troops, many of whose officers and men had taken a downgrading of two or more ranks in order to be able to serve with the United Nations forces.  In Korea, the French battalion had fought in the ranks of the 2d U.S. Infantry Division and had covered itself with glory at Chipyong-ni, Wonju and Arrowhead Ridge."

    In December 1953, GM 100 was moved from the Saigon area to the Central Highlands near Ban Me Thuot.  The GM consisted of the 1st Korea Battalion, the 2nd Korea Battalion, the 520th Vietnamese Commando Battalion, the 10th Colonial Artillery and the 43rd Colonial Infantry Battalion.   By April 1954 GM 100 was located in An Khe.  On 24 June 1954, GM 100 was ordered to evacuate An Khe and proceed to Pleiku.  The unit was ambushed and annihilated 15 kilometers from An Khe on the way to Pleiku.  Pleiku was 100 kilometers west of An Khe.

   In September 1967, the Vietnamese communists once again ambushed their enemy along QL 19, the road from Qui Nhon on the coast to Pleiku in the highlands.  At this time, I was the platoon leader of the 3rd Platoon, C Company, 504th Military Police Battalion assigned to An Khe in support of the 1st Cavalry Division.  The U.S. Army regularly sent supplies from Qui Nhon to An Khe by truck.  The trucks did not travel in convoys, but just as single vehicles.  The road from Qui Nhon to An Khe was not dangerous, but the road from An Khe, especially once Mang Yang Pass was cleared, was dangerous and could not be traveled after night fall.  The truck drivers from Qui Nhon had two choices; drive to Pleiku and stay there over night, or drive to Pleiku and return to Qui Nhon in one day.  The one day trip was the preferred choice but the truck driver had to clear a checkpoint east of Pleiku by a certain time or he could not leave Pleiku.  As it got later in the day drivers rushed to unload and take off to clear the checkpoint.  This rush produced a high density of trucks late in the day and long line of trucks following each other slowly along QL 19.  This long line of close following trucks was an attractive target for the Vietnamese communists and on 2 September 1967 they executed an ambush. 

   Our standard military police operating procedure for highway patrol was to proceed west from An Khe to CP 102 in Mang Yang Pass to link up with highway patrols from B Company, 504th M.P. Battalion each morning.  As our two gun jeeps, standard jeeps modified with armor and a post for mounting an M-60 machine gun, drove west toward CP 102 the jeep gunners would fire into any locations along the road that might harbor enemy ambushers.  This was named "recon by fire".  Upon arriving at CP 102 and linking up with B Company highway patrol, a radio message would be sent back to Qui Nhon that the road was open and trucks could begin their drive to Pleiku.  At the end of the day, B Company highway patrol jeeps would wait at the Pleiku check point until the last truck to be allowed to depart had passed.  The M.P. jeeps followed the truck to CP 102.  Our 3rd Platoon highway patrol jeeps would plan to end up at CP 102 at the end of the day to wait for the last truck and then take over following it to An Khe.  All trucks that made it past the Pleiku checkpoint were allowed to continue from An Khe to Qui Nhon even after night fall.  Our 3rd Platoon highway patrol's day was ended when they drove into An Khe behind the last truck.

   A day or two after the ambush of 2 September 1967 I wrote an after action report.  I kept a copy all these years and have reproduced it below.  As a result of their actions during the ambush, I recommended awards for valor for Sgt. Cox and M.P.'s Woodell, Morin, Phipps and Bledsoe.  I was convinced that the highest award ought to go to Sgt. Cox not only for his bravery but also for his leadership in combat.  Sgt. Cox was an experienced infantryman who had been in combat in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam before transferring to the military police.  The Army agreed with all of my recommendations except that they upgraded the Army Commendation Medal for Valor to a Silver Star for M.P. Morin.

After Action Report

To:  Commanding Officer, Co C

1. At approximately 1900 hrs, 2 Sep 67, a convoy of approximately 100 vehicles traveling East on QL 19 from Pleiku was ambushed between CP 89 and 96 by a VC force of approx. 80 men.  The ambush site was approximately 1000 meters long and the enemy used at least 2 command detonated mines, 57 mm and 75 mm recoilless rifles, and automatic weapons.  The vehicles had been proceeding at a slow rate and were bunched tightly in the killing zone when ambushed.  The highway patrol was notified and arrived on the scene while the ambush was still in progress. MP's COX, WOODELL, MORIN, BLEDSOE and PHIPPS found the drivers stopped and milling around, and all traffic jammed up.  The MP's led by SGT COX successfully began to move the convoy almost wholly as a result of SGT. COX's efforts.  They then began to provide cover fire and extract wounded and dead from the damaged vehicles.  SGT. COX several times exposed himself to hostile fire in order to retrieve wounded men.  At approximately 1930 hrs the 3^rd Platoon sent reinforcements in two vehicles consisting of SGT. TOMLIN, MIDOLO, DESENA, LECLAIR, CARTER and PALUMBO.  They arrived at the scene and established security and traffic control, and directed recovery vehicle operations.  At 1940 hrs a second reinforcement of two vehicles with LT BRIGGS, MELNICK, YOUNG and TRUMBO performed a recon to the west of the ambush site to determine the position of the last damaged vehicle.  They then established security and directed recovery operations.  All Military Police remained on the scene until 0130 hrs 3 Sep 67, when all vehicles but one were either removed to Camp Radcliff or to a position adjacent to an artillery fire base near CP 89.  After informing LTC HUNZEKER, CO, 34^th S & S Bn, who was OIC of recovery operations, and receiving approval LT BRIGGS sent all MP's except two armored vehicles back to the unit.  The highway patrol remained until 0300 when the final vehicle was brought to the artillery fire base.
2. There were over 23 vehicles of varying sizes damaged.  The exact number is unknown at this time. The vehicles were empty at the time they were damaged.  I felt that the vehicles for what they were worth were secure at the fire base and traffic control had been established, and the MP job was complete for the night.  The OIC decided to bring all vehicles into Camp Radcliff that night.  Since the 70^th Engineer Bn was on the scene with wreckers and gun jeeps, I felt they could handle security of the operation.  At approximately 0305 hrs the fire base and CP 89 received mortar and automatic weapons fire.  Casualties and damage is unknown at this time.
3. There were 19 WIA and 8 KIA in the ambush site.  I feel damage and casualties would have been much higher except for the action of the highway patrol.  Recommendations of a BSM for SGT COX and ACM W/V for WOODELL, MORIN, PHIPPS, and BLEDSOE will follow.

   When MP's Melnick, Young, Trumbo and I arrived at the scene of the ambush wrecked trucks were everywhere as well as the bodies of those who had been killed.  I have a vivid image of one body of an American soldier, cut in half at the waist, draped over the hood of a truck.  When I debriefed the MP's who had first arrived at the ambush site they were all unanimous in praising Sgt. Cox.  Evidently Sgt. Cox came across an officer in a jeep who was attempting to drive back to Pleiku.  Sgt. Cox stopped the jeep and asked him where he was going.  He said he was going to Pleiku for help.  Sgt. Cox told him the best thing he could do was go to the front of the line of trucks and lead them out of the kill zone and on to An Khe.  Sgt. Cox "forcefully encouraged" the officer to do so and went with him toward the front of the line of trucks.  Sgt. Cox found that the drivers had gotten out of their trucks and were trying to return fire.  He ordered every driver he could find to get back in the trucks and take them through the kill zone.  This probably saved a lot of lives.  Once the drivers understood they needed to clear the kill zone, Sgt. Cox and his men began to lay down suppressing fire with the machine guns, M-16's and the M-79 grenade launcher that Sgt. Cox always carried in his jeep.  Helicopter gunships began to arrive and needed to be told where to fire their guns.  It was also getting dark and the gunships needed markers to see where the friendly troops were.  MP Morin, in addition to firing his machine gun from the gun jeep, tossed flares over the side of his jeep to mark the side of the road and used his radio to tell the gunships where to fire and then continued firing his own machine gun.

   The military police were, at that time, considered combat support troops and in this instance it certainly turned out they were.